The valuation of evidence
[First published in The Leader for June 25, 1853.]
With Spirit-rappings and Table-movings still the rage, and with the belief in Spontaneous Combustion still unextinguished, it seems desirable that something should be said in justification of that general scepticism with which the philosophical meet the alleged wonders that periodically turn the heads of the nation. Nothing less than a bulky octavo would be needed to contain all that might be written on the matter; and unfortunately such an octavo, when written, would be little read by those most requiring it. A brief hint or two, however, may find listeners among them.
“I tell you I saw it myself,” is the so-thought conclusive assertion with which many a controversy is abruptly ended. Commonly those who make this assertion think that after it nothing remains to be urged; and they are astonished at the unreasonableness of those who still withhold their belief. Though they reject many tales of witchcraft, many ghost stories whose marvels were attested by eye-witnesses—though they have repeatedly seen stage-conjurors seem to do things which they do not believe were really done—though they have heard of the Automaton Chess-player and the Invisible Girl, and have perhaps seen explanations of the modes in which the public were deluded by them—though in all these cases they know that the facts were other than the spectators supposed them to be; yet they cannot imagine that their own perceptions have been vitiated by influences like those which vitiated the perceptions of others. Or, to put the thing more charitably and perhaps more truly, they forget that such vitiations are constantly occurring.
To observe correctly, though commonly thought very easy, every man of science knows to be difficult. Our faculties are liable to report falsely from two opposite causes—the presence of hypothesis, and the absence of hypothesis. To the dangers arising from one or other of these, every observation we make is exposed; and between the two it is hard to see any fact quite truly. A few illustrations of the extreme distortions arising from the one cause, and the extreme inaccuracy consequent on the other, will justify this seeming paradox.
Nearly every one is familiar with the myth prevalent on our sea-coasts, respecting the Barnacle Goose. The popular belief was, and indeed is still in some places, that the fruits on branches which hang into the sea become changed into shell-covered creatures called barnacles, found incrusting these submerged branches; and further, that these barnacles are in process of time transformed into the birds known as barnacle geese. This belief was not confined to the vulgar; it was received among naturalists. Nor was it with them simply an adopted rumour. It was based on observations which were recorded and approved by the highest scientific authorities, and published with their countenance. In a paper contained in the Philosophical Transactions, Sir Robert Moray says:—“In every shell that I opened . . . there appeared nothing wanting, as to the external parts, for making up a perfect sea-fowl; the little bill like that of a goose, the eyes marked, the head, neck, breast, wings, tail, and feet formed, the feathers everywhere perfectly shaped and blackish coloured, and the feet like those of other waterfowl, to my best remembrance.” Now this myth respecting the barnacle goose has been exploded for some century and a half. To a modern zoologist who examines one of these cirrhipeds, as the barnacles are called, it seems scarcely credible that it could ever have been thought a chick; and what Sir Robert Moray could have taken for “head, neck, breast, wings, tail, feet, and feathers,” he cannot imagine. Under the influence of a pre-conception, here is a man of education describing as “a perfect sea-fowl” what is now known to be a modified crustacean—a creature belonging to a remote part of the animal kingdom.
A still more remarkable instance of perverted observation exists in an old book entitled Metamorphosis Naturalis, &c., published at Middleburgh in 1662. This work, in which is attempted for the first time a detailed account of insect-transformations, contains numerous illustrative plates, in which are represented the various stages of evolution—larva, pupa, and imago. Those who have any knowledge of Entomology will recollect that the chrysalises of all our common butterflies exhibit at the anterior end a number of pointed projections, producing an irregular outline. Have they ever observed in this outline a resemblance to a man’s face? For myself, I can say that though in early days I kept brood after brood of butterfly larvæ through all their changes, I never perceived any such likeness; nor can I see it now. Nevertheless, in the plates of this Metamorphosis Naturalis, each chrysalis has its projections so modified as to represent a burlesque human head—the respective species having different profiles given them. Whether the author was a believer in metempsychosis, and thought he saw in the chrysalis a disguised humanity; or whether, swayed by the false analogy which Butler makes so much of, between the change from chrysalis to butterfly and that from mortality to immortality, he considered the chrysalis as typical of man; does not appear. Here, however, is the fact, that influenced by some pre-conception or other, he has made his drawings quite different from the actual forms. It is not that he simply thinks this resemblance exists—it is not that he merely says he can see it; but his preconception so possesses him as to swerve his pencil, and make him produce representations laughably unlike the realities.
These, which are extreme cases of distorted perceptions, differ only in degree from the distorted perceptions of daily life; and so strong is the distorting influence that even the man of science cannot escape its effects. Every microscopist knows that if they have conflicting theories respecting its nature, two observers shall look through the same instrument at the same object, and give quite different descriptions of its appearance.
From the dangers of hypothesis let us now turn to the dangers of no hypothesis. Little recognized as is the fact, it is nevertheless true that we cannot make the commonest observation correctly without beforehand having some notion of what we are to observe. You are asked to listen to a faint sound, and you find that without a pre-conception of the kind of sound you are to hear, you cannot hear it. Provided that it is not strong, an unusual flavour in your food may pass quite unperceived, unless some one draws attention to it, when you taste it distinctly. After knowing him for years, you shall suddenly discover that your friend’s nose is slightly awry, and wonder that you never remarked it before. Still more striking becomes this inability when the facts to be observed are complex. Of a hundred people who listen to the dying vibrations of a church bell, almost all fail to perceive the harmonics, and assert the sound to be simple. Scarcely any one who has not practised drawing, sees, when in the street, that all the horizontal lines in the walls, windows, shutters, roofs, seem to converge to one point in the distance: a fact which, after a few lessons in perspective, becomes visible enough.
Perhaps I cannot more clearly illustrate this necessity for hypothesis as a condition to accurate perception, than by narrating a portion of my own experience relative to the colours of shadows.
Indian ink was the pigment which, during boyhood, I invariably used for shading. Ask any one who has received no culture in art, or who has given no thought to it, of what colour a shadow is, and the unhesitating reply will be—black. This is uniformly the creed of the uninitiated; and in this creed I undoubtingly remained till about eighteen. Happening, at that age, to come much in contact with an amateur artist, I was told, to my great surprise, that shadows are not black but of a neutral tint. This, to me, novel doctrine, I strenuously resisted. I have a pretty distinct recollection of denying it point blank, and quoting all my experience in support of the denial. I remember, too, that the controversy lasted over a considerable period; and that it was only after my friend had repeatedly drawn my attention to instances in Nature, that I finally gave in. Though I must previously have seen myriads of shadows, yet in consequence of the fact that very generally the tint approaches to black, I had been unable, in the absence of hypothesis, to perceive that in many cases it is distinctly not black.
I continued to hold this amended doctrine for some years. It is true that from time to time I observed that the tone of the neutral tint varied considerably in different shadows; but still the divergencies were not such as to shake my faith in the dogma. By-and-bye, however, in a popular work on Optics, I met with the statement that the colour of a shadow is always the complement of the colour of the light casting it. Not seeing the wherefore of this alleged law, which seemed moreover to conflict with my established belief, I was led to study the matter as a question of causation. Why are shadows coloured? and what determines the colour? were the queries that suggested themselves. In seeking answers, it soon became manifest that as a space in shadow is a space from which the direct light alone is excluded, and into which the indirect light (namely, that reflected by surrounding objects, by the clouds and by the sky) continues to fall, the colour of a shadow must partake of the colour of everything that can either radiate or reflect light into it. Hence, the colour of a shadow must be the average colour of the diffused light; and must vary, as that varies, with the colours of all surrounding things. Thus was at once explained the inconstancy I had already noticed; and I presently recognized in Nature that which the theory implies—namely, that a shadow may have any colour whatever, according to circumstances. Under a clear sky, and with no trees, hedges, houses, or other objects at hand, shadows are of a pure blue. During a red sunset, mixture of the yellow light from the upper part of the western sky with the blue light from the eastern sky, produces green shadows. Go near to a gas-lamp on a moonlight night, and a pencil-case placed at right angles to a piece of paper will be found to cast a purple-blue shadow and a yellow-grey shadow, produced by the gas and the moon respectively. And there are conditions it would take too long here to describe, under which two parts of the same shadow are differently coloured. All which facts became obvious to me as soon as I knew that they must exist.
Here, then, respecting certain simple phenomena that are hourly visible, are three successive convictions; each of them based on years of observation; each of them held with unhesitating confidence; and yet only one—as I now believe—true. But for the help of an hypothesis, I should probably have remained in the common belief that shadows are black. And but for the help of another hypothesis, I should probably have remained in the half-true belief that they are neutral tint.
Is it not clear, therefore, that to observe correctly is by no means easy? On the one hand, a pre-conception, makes us liable to see things not quite as they are, but as we think them. On the other hand, in the absence of a pre-conception, we are liable to pass over much that we ought to see. Yet we must have either a pre-conception or no pre-conception. Evidently, then, all our observations, save those guided by true theories already reached, are in danger of either distortion or incompleteness.
It remains but to remark, that if our observations are imperfect in cases like the foregoing, where the things seen are persistent, and may be again and again looked at or continuously contemplated; how much more imperfect must they be where the things seen are complex processes, changes, or actions, each presenting successive phases, which, if not truly observed at the moments they severally occur, can never be truly observed at all! Here the chances of error become immensely multiplied. And when, in addition, there exists some moral excitement,—when, as in these Spirit-rapping and Table-turning experiments, the intellect is partially paralysed by fear or wonder correct observation becomes next to an impossibility.